SAN FRANCISCO, CA - In the wake of a devastating supply chain attack in the npm registry that left millions of enterprise applications compromised and billions of user records exposed, developers across the JavaScript ecosystem expressed deep sorrow today, lamenting that such a crisis was completely unavoidable. “It’s a shame, but what can you do? This is just the price of building modern web apps,” said Senior Frontend Engineer Mark Vance, echoing the sentiments of a community that completely relies on a 40-level-deep nested tree of unvetted packages maintained by pseudonymous strangers to capitalize a single string. “There’s absolutely no way to foresee or prevent someone from taking over a long-abandoned utility package and injecting a crypto-miner into every production build in the world. It’s just an act of nature.”
  • dan@upvote.au
    4·
    15 hours ago

    This is how all language package managers work, unfortunately

    npm does actually support signing and provenance (tracking how the package was built), so in some ways it can be more secure than other package managers. https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements

    If you use one of the CI/CD systems they support (currently Github Actions and Gitlab CI), it can attach a signed attestation to the package stating the commit hash that was used to build the package, along with the steps taken to build it. This is combined with trusted packaging using OpenID Connect with short-lived tokens that are only obtainable in the correct CI environment, rather than using access tokens or username and password.

    It only supports some CI systems because they have to guarantee that the connection between the CI system and npm is secure.

    Some of the recent issues have been attacks on the CI system, rather than npm itself. For example, a Github Action that’s only supposed to run for commits to the main branch, but unintentionally runs for some subset of pull requests too.

    Of course, all this stuff is optional, and pushing to npm directly from a developer’s computer still works and is still not verifiable at all.

    I think the best approach is what Flathub/Flatpak, F-Droid (Android) and Composer/Packagist (PHP) do. You provide your repository URL, and they build the code on their end. Packages are always guaranteed to be built from code in the repo.

    Debian Linux is also moving towards requiring repeatable builds, meaning that a package built from source should be byte-for-byte identical to the package in the repo.