

But there’s no reason to think it isn’t.
That’s not the case. This is a very active area in academic philosophy and there are, objectively speaking, several reasons to think that consciousness is not solely a material process (whether or not you think these are good reasons is for you to decide). For an accessible introduction to this topic I recommend Facing up to the problem of consciousness by David Chalmers. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the Knowledge Argument is also a good intro if you are looking to dive right into something a bit more technical.





The way you’re discussing ‘models’ seems to assume two points: (1) that all useful models will be physical models, and (2) that we have models that work in this context. Neither of these assumptions are correct.
For the first point, arguably the most popular model of consciousness we have at the moment is Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT is explicitly a panpsychist theory (all matter has some non-zero quantity of consciousness). This lends itself very well to non-physicalist interpretations (where consciousness is a fundamental constituent of the universe, irreducible to matter).
For the second point, all this discussion of models is largely besides the point. Because there is currently no model of conscious experience that works. No theory is widely accepted. And the theories that were once popular (global workspace theory and even IIT) seem to not the supported by evidence (proponents of these theories have tried to modify them to fit the data, but you can only do that so many times before things start to looks sketchy). So whether we use a model or not, it’s not really relevant to this discussion, because we currently have no scientific models of consciousness that work.