

I’m not familiar with cereal bags being accepted for recycling at grocery stores – although I’m aware that grocery store recycling in California has deep issues regarding implementation – but regarding why a chip bag is different than a cereal bag, my guess is that it has to do with the former being air tight.
Chip bags are intentionally filled with gas (usually nitrogen) in order to preserve the contents for a long shelf life. Rather conveniently, this also helps the chips not smash up against other chip bags in the same box, at the cost of fitting fewer bags into a shipping container. As such, chip bags have to be air tight, and mylar is good at that, as evidenced by mylar balloons that keep helium inside for far longer than a latex balloon (to the sadness of every electricity provider on Earth).
Whereas I suspect the clear plastic – maybe polyethylene? – bags used for cereal have different requirements, because a cereal box already provides mechanical protection against other boxes, and an expectation that cereals (a bona fide breakfast foodstuff, compared to chips which have always been categorized as a snack food) will be eaten in quantities that make recyclability a priority; this is a guess.
I also think cereals might historically have been just free-floating inside the box, in the same way that dishwasher power detergent is still packaged within a thick cardstock box, with a pour-out metal spout. That said, this citation seems to indicate that cereal bags are in-fact liners, which would suggest the primary reason is one of food safety, if contact directly with the inside of the box would be a problem.
And this kinda makes sense to me, since nobody would want to eat soggy cereal if a bit of rainwater seeped through the box and contacted the food.




Setting aside the Forgejo issues for a moment, I can’t quite see the logic behind the author’s description of a “carrot disclosure”.
As written, it’s a third option for disclosure, beyond 1) coordinated disclosure (often 90 days for the vendor to fix things) or 2) full disclosure (immediately going public, esp when the vulnerability is believed to be actively exploited). But what the author describes as the carrot is to publish only the output of a proof-of-concept, and then the onus is on the vendor to figure out both the vulnerability and the fixes.
This seems wildly irresponsible to me, to put the effort into writing a working PoC but then to willfully withhold it, so as to basically force the vendor into a wild goose chase. And that’s the best case scenario, when the PoC is actually legit. At worst, it’s a DoS against a vendor (causing them to re-audit code to find a bug that doesn’t actually exist, eg hallucinated AI slop) or is a form of defamation to scare users away.
Then there’s the issue of when it’s not a “vendor” per-se but a group of volunteers of an open-source project, which I will distinguish from commercial vendors as “maintainers”. Is it ethical to withhold an already-written PoC from FOSS maintainers, whom often do not have the material capabilities to do a full-scale audit when given basically no clues?
To be clear, I’m not a security researcher and have done zero disclosures of any form. But if I ever ran a project and received a so-called carrot disclosure, why shouldn’t I immediately call their bluff and treat it as full-disclosure? This situation seems like Schrodinger’s Cat, where the only way to rip away the uncertainty is to throw open the box. Worse case, the project suffers the reputational hit for having a legit vulnerability. But best case, the vulnerability is non-existent. But what this supposed “third way” purports to do is no different than sowing the seeds of fear, uncertainty, and doubt amongst users. Someone tell me how this isn’t one step away from extortion.
I think game theory would say that any and all recipients of “carrot” disclosures should always call the bluff, immediately and vocally. I don’t see any way for such disclosures to be anything but unnecessarily antagonistic. I refuse to credit the term with any legitimacy.